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TRADEMARKS LAW 
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE v. 
SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS: NO 
OLYMPIC TORCH FOR THE GAY GAMES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts 
& Athletics,l the Ninth Circuit held that the International 
Olympic Committee (lOC) and the United States Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) have exclusive property rights in the word 
"Olympic" for trade and promotion purposes. 1 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order grant-
ing IOC and USOC summary judgment and a permanent injunc-
tion barring the use of the word "Olympic" by San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics (SF AA), sponsors of the "Gay Olympic 
Games." However, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the 
. $96,6001 attorney fee award that the lower court had granted 
IOC and USOC.4 
II. FACTS 
IOC5 and USOC' brought suit under the Amateur Sports 
1. 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986)(per Goodwin. J.; the other panel members were Wal-
lace, J. and Stephens, D.J. sitting by designation), cert. granted, 55 U.s.I.. W. 3247 (U.s. 
Oct. 21, 1986)(No. 86-270). 
2. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 735-37. 
3. Appellants' Brief at 5, International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics. 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986). 
4. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 735. 
5. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics. 219 U.s.P.Q. 
982 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The International Olympic Committee is a non-profit organization 
created by the Congress of Paris on June 23, 1894 which is organized and exists under 
the laws of Switzerland. ld. at 982. 
6. 36 U.s.C. §§371-396 (1982). The United States Olympic Committee is duly 
129 
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Act of 19787 to restrain and enjoin SFAA8 and Thomas P. Wad-
della from using the phrase "Gay Olympics."lo SF AA used the 
word "Olympic" on paraphernalia and printed materials in con-
junction with the international athletic competition it sponsored 
in San Francisco in August 1982. This competition included and 
benefited lesbians and gay men.ll SF AA failed to obtain USOC's 
consent to use the word "Olympic."12 
The district court granted USOC's application for a tempo-
rary restraining order on August 9, 1982,lS and granted USOC's 
motion for a preliminary injunction on August 20, 1982.14 SF AA 
appealed, and on April 8, 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
preliminary injunction. 111 
On February 16, 1984, the district court granted USOC and 
IOC summary judgment and a permanent injunction. 1 II The dis-
trict court awarded USOC $96,600 in attorney fees on Septem-
ber 21, 1986.17 SF AA appealed the judgment, the injunction, and 
the attorney fees award,18 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed both 
the judgment and the injunction but remanded the fee award. 
SF AA subsequently filed a petition for rehearing and a sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied. The 
chartered and functions under the laws of the United States. International Olympic 
Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 982. USOC was first incorpo-
rated and granted a federal charter in 1950. However, predeceasors to the now federally 
chartered USDC have existed since 1896. Id. at 982. 
7. 3f: U.S.C. §§371·396 (1982). The Amateur Sports Act is codified at 36 U.s.C. 
§§371·396 (1982). 
8. Appellants' Brief at 6, International Olympic Comm. San Francisco Arts and 
Athletics is a "non-profit corporation, incorporated under California Law in 1981 for the 
purpose of conducting public activities, including athletic and arts events .•• to educate 
the general public on the vitality, variety, and versatility of the gay movement." Id. 
9. Appellants' Brief at 6, International Olympic Comm. Thomas F. Waddell was an 
organizer of SFAA and is its Chairman. Id. 
10. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 735. 
11. Appellants' Brief at 6, International Olympic Comm. 
12. Appellees' Brief at 2, International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts " 
Athletics, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986). 
13. Appellants' Brief at 4, International Olympic Comm. 
14. Id. at 5. 
15. Appellees' Brief at 4, International Olympic Comm. 
16. Appellants' Brief at 5, International Olympic Camm. 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. International Olympic Camm., 781 F.2d at 735; Appellees' Brief at 4-S,Interna-
Hanal Olympic Camm. 
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court, however, amended its decision and a dissent was filed. 111 
On appeal, SF AA first argued that a claim under the Ama-
teur Sports Act required a showing that the use of Olympic 
words and symbols was apt to confuse the public as to whether 
USOC endorsed or sponsored the event and that no such show-
ing was made.20 Second, SF AA contended that because judicial 
enforcement of the Act constituted state action, USOC's selec-
tive enforcement violated the equal protection component of the 
fifth amendment due process clause.lI1 Third, SFAA argued that 
the Act violated the first amendment protections afforded com-
mercial speech by barring non-confusing speech.22 Fourth, SFAA 
asserted that USOC was discriminating against lesbians and gay 
men because it allowed other groups23 to use the word 
"Olympic" while suing SFAA,24 and that this selective enforce-
ment suppressed its freedom of speech.25 Finally, SFAA argued 
that USOC was using a trademark violation claim to censor non-
commerical use of the word "Olympic," and in response SF AA 
raised the Lanham Act defense28 of "fair use in description.''27 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. AMATEUR SPORTS ACT 
In 1978, Congress adopted the Amateur Sports Act,211 which 
19. 789 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1986)(per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Wallace J. and Stephens, D.J. sitting by designation)(as amended on denial of rehearing 
May 22, 1986; Kozinski, J., with whom Pregerson, J. and Norris, J. join dissenting May 
28, 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L. W. 3247 (U.s. Oct. 31, 1986)(No. 86-270). 
20. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. See infra notes 62 & 130 and 
accompanying text. 
21. Id. at 736-37. 
22. Id. at 737. 
23. Appellants' Brief at 25,lntemational Olympic Comm. "USOC has permitted an 
array of non-gay groups, including police, juniors, and others to use ·Olympic.' .. Id. 
24. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. 
25. Appellants' Brief at 22, International Olympic Comm. 
26. 15 U.S.C. §11l5 (1982) lists the Lanham Act defenses; International Olympic 
Comm., 781 F.2d at 736; 6ee infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
27. Appellants' Brief at 13-17, International Olympic Comm.; see infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
28. 36 U.S.C. §§371-396 (1982). The Amateur Sports Act is codified at 36 U.S.C. 
§§371-396 (1982). 36 U.S.C. §38O(a)(4) (1982). The Act provides, in pertinent part, that: 
(a) Without the consent of the Corporation, any person who 
used for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods 
services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic per-
3
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amended the United States Olympic Committee Charter of 
1950.211 Under this legislation, USOC became the coordinating 
body for amateur sports that relate to American participation in 
the Olympic games and other major international competi-
tions.30 The Act provides a mechanism for resolving disputes 
among various sports organizations and athletes.31 
The purpose of the Act was to facilitate USOC's fund rais-
ing ability so that it could send amateur athletes into interna-
tional competition without United States government subsi-
dies.32 To further this purpose, Congress gave USOC the power 
to regulate the commercial use of Olympic words and symbols.33 
The Act also made civil remedies34 provided under the Lanham 
Trademark Act of 194636 available to USOC for the unautho-
Id. 
formance, or competition-
(4)the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," "Citius Altius Fortius," 
or any combination or simluation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a 
connection with the Corporation or any Olympic activity; 
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the Corporation for 
the remedies provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (SO Stat. 427; 
popularly known as the Trademark Act of 1946). 
29. See H.R.Rep. No. 1627, 95th Congo 2d Seas. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code 
Congo & Admin. News 7478, 7481-82. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 264, 266 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 387 (1984). In Intelicense, USOC brought an action to stop 
Intelicense, a Swiss corporation and ita licensees from marketing official pictograms of 
IOC without USOC's consent. The pictograms were graphic designs of athletes agairut a 
backdrop of the five-ring Olympic symboL The court held that USOC's consent was a 
prerequisite to the marketing of the Olympic symbol in the United States. Id. at 264. 
33. Id. at 266. Relying on the legislative history, the Intelicense court found that the 
Congressional intention behind section 380 was promotion of the United States Olympic 
effort by "entrusting the USOC with unfettered control over the commercial use of 
Olympic-related designations.. .. Id. 
34. 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1982). The civil remedies available under the Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946 are injunctive relief and money danJages. Id. See also Callmann, The 
New Trademark Act of July 5, 1946,46 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 946-48 (1946). 
35. 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127 (1982). The Lanham 
Trademark Act of 1946 is codifed at 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-
1127 (1982). Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1946, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1274. The purpose of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 was to protect 
both the public and the owners' trademarks by placing all matters relating to trademarks 
in one statute, thereby eliminating judicial obacurity, simplifying registration, and mak-
ing relief against infringement prompt and effective. Id. 
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rized use of words and symbols associated with the Olympics. sa 
When it provided these civil remedies. Congress repealed the 
previous criminal penalties for such unauthorized use.S7 
The Act provides that any unauthorized commercial use of 
the word "Olympic" or any simulation that" tends to cause con-
fusion or suggest a false connection with USOC is subject to a 
civil action. sa Congress expanded USOC's protection of Olympic 
words and symbols by adding a new prohibition against the use 
of words and symbols tending to cause confusion or mistake.'" 
36. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 
1117·19 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Stop the Olympic Prnon, S.T.O.P., an organization opposed 
to the post·games use of the Lake Placid Village as a prison, sought a judgment declaring 
its first amendment right to print and distribute "Stop the Olympic Prison" posters and 
to use the word "Olympic" and the interlocking rings symbol in expressing its opposition 
to the construction of the prison. The district court of the Southern District of New 
York held that S.T.O.P. was entitled to a judgment declaring that its posters did not 
violate the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 because its posters were not used for the purpose 
of trade or to induce the sale of goods. Id. 
37. Stop the Olympic Prnon, 489 F. Supp. at 1117·19. From and after September 
21, 1950 until November 8, 1978, 
the section of the USOC's federal charter governing unautho-
rized use of the words and symbols associated with the Olym· 
pics was former section 379 of Title 36, which provided crimi· 
nal penalties for such misuse. The charter nowhere mentioned 
trademark protection. Then in the Amateur Sporta Act of 
1978, 36 U.S.C. §380(a)(as amended 1978), signed into law on 
November 8, 1978, Congress repealed the criminal penalties, 
and instead expressly provided for a civil action under the 
Lanham ~ct. 
Id. at 1117·18. 
38. See 36 U.S.C. §380(a)(4) (1982); see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
39. H.R. Rep. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978) 16, 36-38, reprinted in 1978 
U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 7478, 7494·96. 
Section [380](a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the words 
"Olympic," "Olympiad," "Citius Altius Fortius," and any com· 
binaton thereof, but also any simulation or confusingly similar 
derivation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mis· 
take, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the 
Corporation or any Olympic Activity •••. 
Section (380) carries forward some prohibitions from the ex· 
isting statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new prohibitions, 
e.g. words described in section (a)(4) tending to cause confu· 
sion, to cause mistake, or to deceive with respect to the Corpo-
ration or any Olympic Activity. Accordingly. the Grandfather 
Clause should reBect the permissible, continued use of terms 
under the existing statute which were lawfulfully used prior to 
September 21. 1950. and also permissible. continued use of 
terms under this bill whose lawful use commenced prior to the 
enactment of this legislation. This will avoid the preemption 
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B. STATE ACTION 
"State action" refers to government involvement. Because 
the fifth amendment applies to the federal government and not 
to private parties,~O state action is a necessary element when 11 
violation of the equal protection component of the fifth amende-
ment due process clause is alleged.41 Although federally 
chartered, USOC is a private organization.42 
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidelines 
to determine the existence of state action when the activity is 
ostensibly by a private organization:43 whether the state and the 
private party were seen as one entity in regard to the challenged 
activity," and whether there was a close connection between the 
state and the challenged action so that the action was seen as 
part of the state.45 This is not a precise formula, however, be-
cause the facts of each case must also be studied.48 
of existing lawful uses in both easel. 
[d. at 7496. 
40. Public Utilities Comm. of Columbia v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (l952)(citing 
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (l926)(quoting Talton v. Mayes 163 U.s. 376, 382 
(1896))). 
41. DeFranu v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1192 (D.D.C. 
1980). 
42. [d. In DeFrantz, 25 athletes and one USOC executive board member brought a 
motion to enjoin USOC from carrying out a resolution not to send an American team to 
participate in the XXIInd Olympiad games. The court held that "the decision of the 
USOC not to send an American team to the summer Olympics was not state action, and 
therefore, [did) not give rise to an actionable claim for the infringements of the constitu· 
tional rights alleged." [d. at 1194. Ct. Martin v. International Olympic Comm. 740 F.2d 
670 (9th Cir. 1984) (USOC's acta held to be state action). 
43. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192·93. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 354, 351 
(1974). 
44. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192·93 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au· 
thority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961». The DeFrantz court stated that the first guideline 
used by the Supreme Court involved "an inquiry into whether the state has 80 far insin-
uated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity) that it must be 
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 
1192·93. 
45. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974». The second guideline fashioned by the Supreme Court "in-
volves 8.'1 inquiry of whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the 
challenged action of the regulated entity 80 that the acton of the latter may be fairly 
treated as that of the state itself." DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193. 
46. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1981). The United 
States Supreme Court, however, cautions that it is an impossible task in such cases to 
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In DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee;n the 
district court of the District of Columbia applied these guide-
lines in the context of a civil action against USOC. The 
DeFrantz court determined that USOC's vote not to send an 
American team to the summer Olympics did not constitute state 
action because there was no intermingling between USOC and 
the federal government." Moreover, the court found that there 
was no close connection between the federal government and 
USOC's vote because, even though the government exerted pres-
sure on USOC, the court did not equate this pressure with ac-
tual control over USOC.411 Therefore, there was no state action.lIo 
C. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERICAL SPEECH 
The free use of speech is protected under the first amend-
apply a precise formula for recognition of .tata reaponsiblity under the equal protection 
clause. rd. The Court reasoned that "only b-j lifting facta and weighing circumstances 
can nonobvioUi involvement of the .tate in private conduct be attributed its true signifi-
cance." rd. In Burton, a restaurant located in a public parking building refused to serve 
the plaintiff food or drink because he was Black. rd. at 716. The building was owned by 
an agency of the State of Delaware. rd. The Court held that the state was a joint partici-
pant in the operation of the reataurant, and ita refusal to serve the plaintiff violated the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. rd. at 725. 
47. 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980). 
48. rd. at 1192-93. The DeFrantz court reasoned that there was no intermingling 
because USOC did not receive federal funding and existed and operated independently 
of the federal government. The court concluded that even though the Act linked USOC 
and the federal government because it required USOC to submit an annual report to the 
President and Congress, "this hardly converts such an independent relationship to a 
joint participation." Id. at 1193. 
49. rd. at 1193-94. The DeFrantz court ruled that the federal government had the 
power to prevent athletes from participating in the Olympics but it did not have the 
power to make USOC vote in a certain way. Therefore, this did not constitute state 
control The court said that if power of pel'llussion equated with control, the courts 
wculd be pushed into the untenable poIItion of determining how much pressure 
amounted to sufficient control over a private entity to invoke federal jurisdiction. rd. 
Examples of the governmental pressures that were exerted are: 
rd. at 1184. 
President Carter told membel'll of the Athletes Advisory Coun-
cil, an official body of the USOC, that American athletes will 
not particpate in the Moscow summer games •••• [T]he Presi-
dent sent a telegram to the president and officers of the USOC 
and to its House of Delegates, urging the USOC to vote 
against sending an American team to Moscow. In an April 
10th [1980] speech, the President said that "if legal actions 
are necesary to enforce [my] decision not to send a team to 
Moscow, then I will take those legal actions." 
SO. rd. at 1194. 
7
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ment of the United States Constitution. However, the constitu-
tion tolerates reduced protection for commercial speech. III 
SF AA's use of the word "Olympic" to designate and advertise its 
athletic competition was a commercial use.1I2 
To determine if a restriction on commerical speech violates 
the first amendment, a four-part analysis is used. lls First, if the 
commerical speech concerns a lawful activity and is not mislead-
ing, it is protected." Second, the court determines whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial:!I~ Third, if both in-
quiries produce affirmative answers, the court must then deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the asserted gov-
ernmental interst." Finally, the court determines whether the 
regulation excedes what is necessary to serve the governmental 
interest.1I7 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service 
Commission,lIa the Supreme Court used tbis analysis in deter-
mining that the Commission's advertising policy, which com-
pletely banned an electrical utility's promotional advertising, vi-
olated the first amendment because the Commission failed to 
demonstrate that a more limited regulation could not protect its 
interest in conservation. III The Supreme Court, however, has 
been reluctant to approve regulations that restrict the use of 
particular words because of the danger of suppressing the spe-
51. Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980)(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 463 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978». 
52. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Aria & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733. 
736 (9th Cir. 1986). "It is uncontested that SFAA used 'Olympic' in the promotion of ita 
games. This use involved not only the advertising of the games, but. the selling cf prod-
ucts with the word 'Olympic' on them." ld. 
ld. 
53. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. First, the court stated: 
54.ld. 
'55.ld. 
56.ld. 
57.ld. 
(W)e must determine whet.her the expression is protected by 
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within 
t.hat provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest is lIubstantial. If both inquires yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it. is 
not more extensive then is necessary to serve that. interest. 
58. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
59. ld. at 570. 
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cific ideas and emotions that words convey.eo 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE INITIAL OPINION 
In its initial opinion in International Olympic Committee,'1 
the Ninth Circuit first determined whether an unauthorized use 
of Olympic words and symL Is must cause confusion to the pub-
lic to violate section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act.u It was un-
contested that SF AA used the word "Olympic" in promoting its 
games.83 The court reasoned that, if the Act did not require con-
fusion, summary judgment could be sustained because there 
would be no disputed issue of fact." 
In analyzing this issue, the court considered prior statutory 
law, legislative intent, and case law.eII Prior statutory law pro-
vided criminal sanctions for non-confusing use of the protected 
word "Olympic."" Congress intended the current law to broaden 
the scope of USOC's protection by providing for civil remedies. e7 
To require confusion as an element of USOC's cause of action, 
however, would make the current law narrower than the prior 
law. This suggested that confusion was not a necessary element 
under the Act." 
60. Cohen v. California, 403 U.s. 15, 26 (1971). "[Wle cannot indulge the facile as-
sumption that one can forbid particular words Without also running a substantial risk of 
suppressing ideas in the proceaa. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censor-
nhip of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular 
views." Id. The Cohen Court held that the state's making the simple public display of a 
four-letter expletive on a jacket a criminal offense was inconsistent with the first and 
fourteenth amendments. Id. 
61. 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986). 
62. 36 U.S.C. §§371-96 (1982); International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts 
& Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 756 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts have defined confusion to be when 
the public is apt to believe that USOC endorsed, sponsored, or is aaaociated with the 
unauthorized product or activity. See U.s. Olympic Comm. v. International Fed'n of 
Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. 353, 361 (D.D.C. 1982); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.s. 
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); lupra notes 20 & 28 and 
accompanying text; infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
6~. !nternational Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. 
64.ld. 
65.ld. 
66. Id.; Bee also H.R. Rep. No. 1627 95th Cong. 2d Seas. 1978, 27, reprinted in 1978 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7478, 7495 •. 
67. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. 
68.ld. .. 
9
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The Ninth Circuit also relied on United States Olympic 
Committee v. Intelicense Corp./''i which held that USOC's con-
sent was a prerequisite to marketing the Olympic symbol in the 
United States.70 In Intelicense, the Second Circuit found that a 
showing of false association with USOC was not required.71 The 
Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that confusion WM not a 
necessary element for a claim under the Act72 and affirmed the 
district court's summary judgment.7lI 
The court next determined whether the Lanham Act's'· 
"fair use in description" defense that SF AA raised was applica-
ble.711 Looking to the language of the Amateur Sports Act,78 the 
court noted that the Act did not expressly recognize any Lan-
ham Act defense.77 Because Congress expressly included these 
defenses in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,'8 a simi-
lar statute, the court found that the omission was intentional.''i 
The court also examined the legislative history and determined 
that because the purpose of the Amateur Sports Act was to give 
69. 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 387 (1984). 
70. Id. at 264. 
71. Id. at 266·67. 
72. 36 U.S.C. §380(a)(4) (1982). 
73. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 
735 (9th Cir. 1986). 
74. 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127 (1982). 
75. See 15 U.S.C. §1115 (1982) for a listing of Lanham Act defenses. SFAA argued 
that its use of the word Olympic fell specifically under 15 U.S.C. §1l15(b)(4). Appellants' 
Brief at 14, International Olympic Comm. The provision provides that: 
(b)lf the right to use the registered mark has become incon-
testable ... the registraton shall be conclusive evidence of the 
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in com-
merce or in connection with the goods or services specified in 
the affidavit. .. subject to any conditions or limitations stated 
therein except when one of the following defenses or defects is 
established. 
(4)That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a trade or service 
mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of 
the individual name of anyone in privity with such party. or of 
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in 
good faith only to describe to users the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origin ... 
15 U.S.C. §1ll5(b)(4) (1982). 
76. 36 U.S.C. §§371-396 (1982). 
77. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. 
78. 18 U.S.C. §2320(c) & (dHl)(B) (Supp. 1985). 
79. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. 
10
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USOC more rights than an ordinary trademark holder, SFAA's 
Lanham Act defense would undermine that intent. ao The court, 
therefore, concluded that the Lanham Act defenses were 
inapplicable.'1 
The Ninth Circuit then considered SF AA's contention that 
the application of the Amateur Sports Act to SF AA violated the 
equal protection clause of the fifth amendment.at SFAA argued 
that USOC's enforcement of its rights in the word "Olympic" 
against SFF A discriminated against gay and lesbian groups be-
cause USOC did not act to prevent similar unauthoriized use for 
such events as the Police Olympics and the Junior Olympics." 
The court did not reach the question whether equal protection 
applied or whether USOC discriminated, however, because it 
found no state action in the alleged discrimination." The court 
explained that when tlie state receives no benefit from the chal-
lenged action, state action will not be found unless there was a 
governmental decision to violate a party's rights.llli The court 
concluded that government enforcement of private rights was 
not sufficient grounds for state action. at Even though Congress 
created special property rights in USOC's trademarks, the ex-
ploitation of those rights was not deemed to be state action for 
purposes of an equal protection violation.S? 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed SF AA's assertion that the 
Amateur Sports Act violated its first amendment rights of com-
merical speech." Relying on two Supreme Court decisions,811 the 
SO.Id. 
81.Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.; Appellants' Brief at 25, Internatiol.al Olympic Comm. 
84. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736-37. 
85.Id. 
86. Id. (citing Cobb v. Georgia Power Co., 757 F.2d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985». 
87. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
88.Id. 
89. Id. The court relied on Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 
573-77 (1977), where property rights in the performance of a human cannonball act re-
ceived priorty over first amendment rights of a broadcaster. Zacchini'a human can-
nonball act was video taped without his consent and shown on the eleven o'clock news. 
He brought an action for damages alleging that he was in the entertainment business 
and that the film showing his act was an "unlawful appropriation of [his] professional 
property." Id. at 564. The other case the court relied on was Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.s. 
507,518-21 (1976), where privata property rights defeated a claim to speak freely on the 
property of another. 
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court determined that the word "Olympic" was essentially prop-
erty that could be protected without implicating the first 
amendment. to Suggesting that SFAA had sufficient alternative 
means for expressing itself, the court held that SF AA had no 
first amendment right to use the word "Olympic" in promoting 
its games. '1 
Relying on Ninth Circuit case law,u the court then consid-
ered whether the district court abused its discretion in granting 
the permanent injunction." The court applied a two-part testH 
and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
because it correctly stated the applicable law and because the 
facts were undisputed.'11 The court further found that the in-
junction was not overbroad because it conformed to the stat-
ute, IHI and that the district court was justified in granting the 
injunction in light of SF AA's past improper use of the protected 
words and symbols. I? 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered the propriety of the 
district court's attorney fee award." The court noted that a vio-
lator of the Act is subject to the remedies provided in the Lan-
ham Act." Under the Lanham Act, the court may award attor-
ney fees in exceptional circumstances.loo Because the statute 
does not define exceptional circumstances,lOI the court adopted 
the definition found in the Senate Report which requires a will-
ful violation of the Act. lOS The Ninth Circuit had previously 
adopted this definition. loa 
90. InterTUltioTUlI Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 737-38. Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 
1982); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Fleaher, 605 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1979). 
93. InterTUltioTUll Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 738. 
94. Id. "Abuse of discretion occurs if the district court resta ita conclusion on clearly 
erroneous factual findings or if ita decison relies on erroneous legal conclusions." Id. (cit-
ing Sports Form, Inc., 686 F.2d at 752; Mus Universe, Inc., 605 F.2d at 1133-34). 
95. InterTUJtioTUlI Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 738. 
96.Id. 
97.Id. 
98. Id. 
99. 15 U.S.C.§1117 (1982). InterTUltioTUlI Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 738. 
100. 15 U.S.C. §1117 (1982). 
101. InterTUJtioTUlI Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 738. 
102. Id. 
103. See Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984); Playboy 
Enterprises v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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The district court awarded USOC attorney fees on the the-
ory that SFAA intentionally used the word "Olympic" in violat-
ing the statute.104 The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that the 
district court failed to consider whether SF AA might have rea-
sonably believed its use of the word "Olympic" did not violate 
the statute. 1011 Thus, the court remanded the fee award issue and 
instructed the district court to hold a hearing to determine 
whether SFAA's conduct was sufficiently willful to justify an at-
torney fee award.loe Futhermore, if the district court determined 
that USOC was entitled to fees, it should then decide what con-
stitutes reasonable attorney fees.107 
104. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 738. 
105. Id. at 738·39. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
Id. at 738. 
the rule defining willful infringement in patent cases [was) in· 
structive. Cases construing willful infringement in areas apply 
the rule that one 'who reasonably doubted that the patent was 
valid has not willfully infringed: Lam, Inc. v. Johns·Manville 
Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
1007 (1982). Cf. United States Olympic Comm. v. Union 
Sports Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. 526, 529 (E.D. Va 1983)(attor. 
ney's fees particularly appropriate where 'expenses were 
caused by a recalcitrant defendant without a substantial 
defense'). 
106. InterTlCltional Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 739. To determine whether the con· 
duct was exceptional, the court instructed the district court to use the Ninth Circuit 
decision of Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). In Sealy, the 
court ruled that "[u)nder 15 U.S.C. §1117 reasonable attorney fees may be awarded in 
'exceptional [trademark) cases: A trademark case is exceptional for the purposes of an 
award of attorney's fees where the infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or 
willful." Id. at 1384 (citing Playboy Enterprises v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 
1272. 1276 (9th Cir. 1982»; see S. Rep. No. 1400. 93rd Congress, 2d Sess. (1974). reo 
printed in U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 7132·33. 
107. 718 F.2d at 739. The court relied on the Ninth Circuit decision in Kerr v. 
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). The following should be bal· 
anced in a determination of reasonable attorney fees: 
1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difli.:ulty of 
the questions involved; 3) the sltill required to perform the Ie· 
gal services properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment 
by the attorney due to accepting the case; 5) the customary 
fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limita· 
tions imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the 
amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10) the 'undesirabil-
ity' of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases. 
[d. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
1974». 
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B. THE AMENDED OPINION 
1. The Majority 
SF AA filed a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for re-
hearing en banc, both of which the court denied.lol The panel, 
however, filed an amended opinion that added a footnote de-
fending its decision on the state action issue.lo. The court con-
sidered whether its finding of no state action in this case con-
flicted with its previous finding of state action in Martin v. 
International Olympic Committe.uo In Martin, the court held 
that usoe's denial of equal medal opportunities to women at 
the 1984 Olympic Games constitued state action, and thus ran 
afoul of the equal protection clause.111 The court explained that 
its finding of no state action in the instant case was consistent 
with Martin because, in Martin, there was significantly more 
government involvement. us 
2. Dissent 
In dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the court's interpre-
tation of the Amateur Sports Act raised serious first amendment 
concernsUS because it would prevent any organization other than 
108. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1320. 
109. Id. The court reasoned that the determination whether state action exists de-
pends upon the unique facta of each case. Id. See, e.g. Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961). 
110. 740 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984). In Martin, women runners filed suit against vari-
ous Olympic organizations to require the organizers of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games 
to include 5,000 and 10,000 meter track events f.or women. Id. at 673. The district court 
denied a request for a preliminary injunction to require the organizers to include the 
events. Id. The Ninth Circuirt affirmed and held that the denial of the preliminary 
mandatory injunction was proper. Id. The court found that the district court did not err 
in finding state action present. Id. at 677. 
Id. 
111.ld. 
112. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1320. 
SFAA contends that our firding of no state action conflicta 
with Martin II. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 
670, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). We disagree. The determination 
whether state action exists is entirely dependent on the 
unique facta of each case. Burton II. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 [81 S.Ct. 856, 862, 6 L.Ed.2d 45) 
(1961). In Martin, the government involvement was signifi-
cantly more extensive than that found in this case. 
113. 36 U.S.C. §§371-396 (1978). International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1320. 
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USOC or IOC from using the word "Olympic" and the concepts 
this word embodies.114 Judge Kozinski explained that when the 
Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on the use of particu-
lar words, it has applied strict scrutiny and careful limitations. 11& 
The majority, however, ignored these criteria and dismissed the 
first amendment arguments without fully considering the is-
sue.ll8 Moreover, even though USOC permits some groups, such 
as young people, the disabled, and police, to use the word 
"Olympic," there are no safeguards against USOC's arbitary ex-
clusion of certain groups, such as homosexuals, from using the 
word.u7 
Judge Kozinski then considered whether there was a sub-
stantial governmental interest served in abridging first amend-
ment rights.11I Because the majority interpreted the Amateur 
Sports Act as proscribing all uses of the word "Olympic,"1111 
Judge Kozinski determined that courts must closely scrutinize 
the governmental interest served by this broad protection. no 
Speculating that the Act indirectly subsidized USOC, he con-
cluded that such an end did not justify blanket free speech re-
striction.l2l Finally, Judge Kozinski concluded that the court 
failed to apply the strict scrutiny standard necessary for review-
ing a permanent injunction inhibiting the right of public 
expression.12 :1 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Amateur Sports 
Act gives USOC unlimited rights in the word "Olympic." This 
interpretation, however, raised first amendment concerns that 
114. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1321. "The Supreme Court has 
been extremenly reluctant to approve restrictions against the use of particular words." 
Id. See, e.g. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
115. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1321; see FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.s. 726, 744·51 (1978), reh. den. 439 U.s. 833. Because broadcasting has a 
pervasive presence in America and is uniquely accessible to children, the Court held that 
FCC's ban on patenUy offensive language was justified. Id. at U8-51. 
116. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1321. 
117. Id. at 1323. 
118. Id. at 1323-24 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 U.S. at 564, 566. 
119. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1324. 
12O.ld. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1325. 
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the court failed to adequately address. The result may be wide-
spread infringement of personal freedoms.123 
Relying on legislative history and analogous legislation, the 
court concluded that Congress intentionally omitted the Lan-
ham Act defenses.1U Perhaps, however, this omission was merely 
a Congressional oversight. The defense of "fair use in descrip-
tion"IS1 would create a buffer for protecting the first amendment 
concerns that conflict with USOC's rights in the word 
"Olympic." A balance would be struck between the purpose of 
the Amateur Sports Act, which was to facilitate USOC's fun-
draising ability, U. and the first amendment's interest in free ex-
pression of ideas.1s7 Such a compromise would allow the word 
"Olympic" into the public domain as long as USOC is not finan-
cially harmed. 
A regulation that involves the suppression of speech must 
be no more extensive than necessary to serve the state's inter-
est.1S• The Ninth Circuit's interpretaion of the Act prohibits all 
use of the word "Olympic" that is not authorized by USOC; yet 
the court failed to address whether the statute was more exten-
sive than necessary. A less restrictive regulation might be more 
appropriate to preserve both the first amendment's free speech 
protections and the government's interest in facilitating USOC's 
fundraising ability so that it can send amateur athletes into in-
123. Id. at 1320. See also San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 19, 1986, at 26 col. 1. Cali-
fornia businessman Leo LeBranche brought an action against USOC and lost. He is ap-
pealing that decision and lobbying Congress to amend the law 80 that USOC does not 
have exclusive rights to the use of the word "Olympic." LeBranche contends that the law 
violated his first amendment rights. Id. See also International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d 
at 1323 n. 4. Judge Kozinski examined the Los Angeles, Manhattan, and Olympia tele-
phone directories and discovered over 200 potential violators of the Act because the word 
"Olympic" was part of their business name. Id. 
124. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736. See supra text and accompa-
nying notes 75-81. 
125. 15 U.S.C. §IU5(b)(4) (1982). 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33. 
127. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Pr0-
tection of Expression, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. Rev. 1180 (1970); 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970). This type 
of fair use analysis baa been suggested for the conflict between copyrights and the first 
amendment and lends itself to the conflict between the first amendment and USOC's 
rights. 
128. Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 
(1980). 
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ternational competition without United States government sub-
sidies.12I This could be accomplished by prohibiting confusing 
uses of the word "Olympic" or uses of the word that trade on 
USOC's goodwill in order to defraud people. ISO 
Instead of a commercial speech analysis, the court, relying 
on two Supreme Court cases,131 determined that USOC had a 
property interst in the word "Olympic." Conclusively finding 
that property rights could be protected without violating the 
first amendment,l32 the court avoided any determination 
whether its interpretation of the Act was more extensive than 
necessary. The court overlooked the fact that the word 
"Olympic" embodies certain intellectual and spiritual concepts 
of intense amateur competition and, as a result of its ruling, sup-
pressed these ideas. 
Because government censorship of particular words could 
lead to censorship of unpopular views, the Supreme Court re-
quires a specific and compelling reason to justify the censorship 
of particular words. us In Cohen v. California1S4 the Supreme 
Court held that a disorderly conduct conviction based on the 
public display of a four-letter expletive on a jacket violated the 
first and fourteenth amendments. In Here, because the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed the case before trial, whether USOC has a spe-
cific and compelling justification for its control over the word 
"Olympic" remains unsettled. 
USOC's property rights would be adequately protected if 
the Amateur Sports Act were construed to prohibit only those 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 32 & 33 for a discussion of the govern-
ment's interest. 
130. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Confusing speech is defined as the 
use of Olympic worda and symbols that is apt to cause the public to believe that USOC 
endorsed or sponsored the event. 
131. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-77 (1977); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.s. 507, 518-21 
(1976). See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
132. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. See supra note 89 and accom-
panying text. "[T)he word Olympic and its associated symbols and slogans are essen-
tially property. Such property rights can be protected without violating the First 
Amendment." International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
133. Cohen v. California, 403 U.s. 15, 26 (1971). 
134. Id. at 15. 
135. Id. at 26. 
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uses that were likely to cause confusion or result in financial loss 
to USOC instead of suppressing all unauthorized uses of the 
word "Olympic."ue Such an interpretation would also be more 
consistent with the first amendment's prohibiton against the 
suppression of particular words and ideas. lS1 
The drafting of an amended opinion appears to indicate 
that the court was not thorough in its first analysis and found it 
necessary to clarify its position. The initial opinion in Interna-
tional Olympic Committee failed to distinguish the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Martin v. International Olympic Commit-
tee.lU In Martin, the court found state action,!" but in 
International Olympic Committee, it did not.140 Even though 
the court did not change its result in the amended opinion,141 it 
appears that it ignored or overlooked Martin in its initial deci-
sion. Because Judge Wallace, who was on the panel in both' 
cases, wrote the Martin opinion, it is unlikely that the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee court overlooked Martin. It can only 
be hoped, however, that this was not a political decision influ-
enced by the parties involved, or that Martin has not been over-
ruled sub silentio. 
Another example of the court's cursory disposition in Inter-
national Olympic Committee was the panel's impromptu ap-
proval of the injunction. This does not measure up to the close 
appellate scrutiny required for first amendment claims and de-
fenses. U2 The majority simply dismissed SF AA's first amend-
ment argument by finding that the word "Olympic" was prop-
erty that could be protected without violating the first 
amendment.143 This does not evidence the close inspection or 
136. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1324. 
137. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
138. Martin v. Inwrnational Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984). 
139. Id. at 677. See supra text accompanying note Ill. 
140. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
141. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1320. The court merely stated that 
its finding of no state action in the instant case W83 consistent with Martin because in 
Martin there W83 significantly more government involvement. However, the court did 
not offer any exanlples to explain the difference. Id. See supra note 112 and accompany· 
ing text. 
142. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1325·26 (citing Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.s. 485 (1984); Standard Oil Co. of California 
v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978». 
143. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
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searching study that the Supreme Court has required before the 
use of certain words can be restricted.144 The court's analysis 
falls short of thorough appellate review and sets a disturbing 
precedent.1fI In finding that certain words and phrases are prop-
erty instead of speach,148 the court failed to protect the first 
amendment concerns that conflict with these property rights. 
The decision, as written, may be interpreted as giving private 
corporations and organizations undue power to infringe first 
amendment rights. Hopefully, this is an isolated case, so that 
other words and phrases will not be found to be "property." The 
judicial recognition of possessory rights in language created in 
International Olympic Committee can only have a chilling effect 
on free expression. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act protects USOC's 
property rights in the word "Olympic," effectively granting 
USOC a monopoly in the use of this word. The Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of the Act, however, fails to provide any limita-
tion on USOC's arbitrary exercise of these rights. Consequently, 
the court has removed the word "Olympic" from the public do-
main without providing any safeguards to ensure against 
USOC's arbitrary enforcement of these rights. The result, as the 
instant case demonstrates, is the chilling of all ideas and emo-
tions embodied in the word "Olympic." 
Christopher W. Coffey· 
144. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978); see supra 
text accompanying note 115. 
145. International Olympic Comm., 789 F.2d at 1326. 
146. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737. 
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